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COMMENT:
COMPARISON OF WASHINGTON AND FEDERAL
GIFT TAXES
Generally, federal gift tax consequences are uppermost in the
Washington lawyer's mind when he deals with gift tax problems.
Consequently, certain differences in the Washington gift tax law are
inadvertently overlooked. Although the Washington Act was patterned
after the federal act of 1932,1 several important areas of difference
do exist between the two statutes. The purpose of this comment is to
explain portions of the Washington gift tax statute, while comparing
and contrasting it with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The dearth of cases construing the Washington gift tax statute
presents a problem in areas where the statute is ambiguous. Since
the Washington State Tax Commission's gift tax regulations merely
paraphrase the statute, federal case law and regulations have been
relied upon in areas where the Washington and the federal statutes
are substantially the same. As a practical matter, these are the only
sources available to the Washington lawyer. The worth of such federal
authority is questionable since the Washington Tax Commission will
not necessarily follow federal precedent. As a practical matter, a
phone call to the "Division" may save many headaches.
TRANSFERS SUBJECT TO GIFT TAX
No apparent difference exists between the state and federal law
regarding transfers subject to the gift tax. As a general rule, any
transfer subject to the federal gift tax will also be subject to the
Washington gift tax.' The Washington statute provides that a tax
shall be imposed upon the privilege of transferring property by gift.'
The tax applies whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, and
whether the gift is direct or indirect.4 Only transfers of property (real
I Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 245.
2 One of the exceptions to the general rule is a transfer by power of appointment,
to be discussed infra. Another is the transfer of real property to a joint tenancy
between husband and wife, also discussed infra.
3RCW 83.56.030(1).
4 Washington State Tax Commission Regulations Relating to Gift Taxes, Art. 7,
provides that "a taxable gift may be effected by the declaration of a trust, by the
foregoing of a debt, by the assignment of a judgment, by the assignment of the
benefits of a contract of insurance, or the naming of the beneficiary thereof, or the
transfer of cash, certificates of deposit, or federal, state, or municipal bonds. Inasmuch
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or personal, tangible or intangible) by individuals are subject to the
gift tax.' The tax is not applicable to transfers by corporations.6
A gratuitous transfer of community property to a person other than
a member of the community results in two gifts--one by each spouse
for one-half of the whole value of the transferred property.' The
conversion of separate property into community property, no matter
how effected, will result in a gift of one-half the value of the separate
property.'
A "gift" for state and federal tax purposes is not -limited to its
common law meaning-a transfer of property without consideration.
Any "voluntary and complete transfer of property by an individual
for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, which is not a bona fide business transfer at arm's length,"1 is
deemed a "gift."
A taxable gift requires a "complete" transfer of property. The
amount of control over the property retained by the donor is the key
to the "completeness" of the transfer. The Washington statute. pro-
vides that a transfer of property in trust where the donor retains the
power to revest title in himself, "either alone, or in conjunction with
any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition
of such property or the income therefrom," is not a taxable gift." The
transfer becomes complete upon the relinquishment or termination of
the power during the donor's lifetime. 2 Any payment of income there-
from to a beneficiary other than the donor is a taxable gift.
The Washington statute mentions only retention by the donor of a
as the tax is imposed upon gifts indirectly made, all transactions whereby property
or property rights or interests are donatively passed or conferred upon another, re-
gardless of the means or device employed, constitute gifts stibject to tax."
5 If the transfer is by a resident of the state the tax shall not apply to gifts of
real or tangible personal property permanently located outside the .state of Wash-
ington. If the transfer is by a nonresident the tax shall apply only to a transfer of
real or tangible personal property permanently located within the state of Washington.
RCW 83.56.030 (1).
6A transfer by gift from a corporation to an individual is treated as a gift from
the shareholders of the corporation. See Washington State. Tax Commission Regula-
tions Relating to Gift Taxes, Art. 7(a) and Treas. Reg. § 252511-1(h)'(1) (1958).
7 RCW 83.56.030(2).8 INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 2513, affords non-community property states the same
tax treatment through the use of the marital deduction.
9 See Washington Tax Commission Regulations Relating to Gift Taxes, Art. 7(g).
10 LoWNDES AND KRAmmu, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAxES § 24.1 (2d ed. 1962).
See Washington Tax Commission Regulations Relating to Gift Taxes, Art. 1; RCW
83. 6.070; INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 2512; Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).
"1RCW 83.56.030(3). This provision was taken verbatim from § 501(c) of the
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 245. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) and (e)(1958). The leading federal case supporting this proposition is Burnet v. Guggen-
eim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
12 RCW 83.56.030(3); Treas. Reg. § 252511-2(f) (1958).
19631
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
power to revest. title. However, other retained powers have affected
the taxability of gifts under federal case law. In Sanford's Estate v.
Comm'r,5 the settlor, although divesting himself of any power to
revoke the trust or to make himself a beneficiary, retained the power
to change the beneficiaries. Such a power was held to render the
transfer incomplete; hence, no taxable gift resulted upon the creation
of the trust.'4 The court emphasized that such a transfer was incom-
plete and therefore subject to the estate tax. The holding was but-
tressed by a desire to correlate the gift and estate taxes which were
thought to be mutually exclusive. A later case, Smith v. Shaughnessy,"5
rejected this theory. There T made a gift of stock in trust to W for
life. Upon the death of W, if T survived, the stock would revert to
him. If T predeceased W, the stock went according to W's will or by
intestacy to W's heirs. The court stated:
The essence of a gift by trust is the abandonment of control over the
property put in trust. The separable interests transferred are not gifts
to the extent that power remains to revoke the trust or recapture the
property represented by any of them, Burnet v. Guggenheim, supra, or
to modify the terms of the arrangement so as to make other disposi-
tions of the property, Sanford v. Commissioner, supra. In the Sanford
case the grantor could, by modification of the trust, extinguish the
donee's interest at any instant he chose. In cases such as this, where
the grantor has neither the form nor substance of control and never
will have unless he outlives his wife, we must conclude that he has
lost all "economic control" and that the gift is complete except for the
value of his reversionary interest.16
The test of "completeness" at the federal level, accordingly, "is not
whether the transfer is complete under the estate tax, but whether the
transferred property has passed beyond the control of the transferor,
in the sense that it is no longer subject to his will.' Although the
Washington statuteonly mentioned retention of the power to revest
title, it is safe to conclude that no difference exists between federal and
state law concerning the effect of the donor's retained control.
13 308 U.S. 39 (1939).-
14 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958) has adopted the rule announced in the Sanford
case. However, if the reserved power is a fiduciary power limited by a fixed or ascer-
tainable standard there is a complete gift.
15 318 U.S. 176, 179 (1943).
16 Id., at 180-81.
17 LOWNDES & KRAMEa, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 620. The Smith case also held
that the reversionary interest, if capable of actual valuation, will not be subject to the
gift tax. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943), held that before a reversionary
interest can be subtracted from the value of property transferred it is necessary that
the transferor at least establish the possibility of approximating its value.
[Voi- 38
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A transfer in trust is also rendered incomplete at both levels where
the settlor can alter or revoke the trust only with the consent of a
person who lacks a substantial adverse interest." However, where the
transfer can be altered or revoked by the settlor only with the consent
of a person possessing a substantial adverse interest, the transfer is
complete and a taxable gift results. 9 A substantial adverse interest is
an economically significant interest in a beneficiary which may be
prejudiced or extinguished by the exercise of a power to alter or revoke
the trust.2 Any part of the trust which can be altered or revoked
without adversely affecting the person required to concur in the exer-
cise of the power is not completely transferred. A taxable gift will
result only to the extent of the substantial adverse interest owned by
the person whose concurrence is necessary.2
The general principles derived from the foregoing federal authorities
can be used as a guide to determine the scope of the Washington gift
tax law.2
SPECIFIC AREAS OF DIFFERENCE
Joint Interests. Taxation of joint interests has gained importance
as a result of the recent enactment of the Washington joint tenancy
statute.2" A transfer without consideration of separate property to be
held in joint tenancy with another will result in a gift of one-half of
the value of the property under both state and federal law.2'
Is RCW 83.56.030(3) ; Treas. Reg. § 25251 1-2(e) (1958). A trustee, as such, is not
a person saving a substantial adverse interest. Ibid. See generally: Latta v. Comm'r,
212 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 825 (1954); Camp v. Comm'r,
195 F.2d 999 (lst Cir. 1952).
19 See generally: Camp v. Comm'r, 195 F2d 999 (1st Cir. 1952); Higgins v.
Comm'r, 128 F2d 237 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942); Comn'r v.
Prouty, 115 F.2d 331 (lst Cir. 1940).2 0 Cases cited .notes 17 and 18 supra. See also, Comm'r v. Betts, 123 F.2d 534 (7th
Cir. 1941). INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 672(a), for income tax purposes, defines a
person possessing an adverse interest "as any person having a substantial beneficial
interest in the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or non-exercise
of the power which he possesses respecting the trust." A person holding a general
power of appointment is deemed to possess a beneficial interest in the trust.
21 For example, if S transfers property in trust to B for life, remainder to R, re-
serving the power to revoke in conjunction with B, there will be a complete transfer
and taxable gift of B's life estate. However, there will not be a completed gift of the
remainder because B has no interest adverse to the exercise of the power to revoke
the remainder.
22 A more complete discussion can be found in 5 MaRTENS, LAW OF FEDmAL GiFT
AND ESTATE TAXATION §§ 33.01-34.72 (1959).
2a RCW 64.28. The statute is treated extensively in Joint Tenancy Symposium, 37
WA H. L. Ray. 1-100 (1962).
24 RCW 83.56.030(1) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2511. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (5)
(1958), provides that "if A with his own funds purchases property and has the title
conveyed to himself and B as joint owners, with rights of survivorship ... but which
rights may be defeated by either party severing his interest, there is a gift to B in
1963]
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The 1954 Code provides special tax treatment for the creation of a
joint tenancy in real property between husband and wife.2" It permits
a husband to create a joint tenancy in real property between himself
and his spouse without the current payment of any gift tax. The
creation of such a joint tenancy is not considered a transfer for federal
gift tax purposes. A gift tax is payable only if the tenancy is subse-
quently terminated by an event other than death. The donor, however,
may elect to pay the gift tax upon the initial transfer. Washington
lacks such a provision, and would treat it as a transfer subject to the
gift tax at the date of transfer.
The federal and Washington gift tax laws provide for similar treat-
ment of joint bank accounts.2" A transfer of funds into a joint bank
account is not a taxable event." Rather, the gift results when the
noncontributing party draws upon the account for his own benefit,
and it is measured by the amount of the withdrawal.
United States savings bonds payable to co-owners are taxed at the
federal level in the same manner as joint bank accounts. 9 Washington
law makes no provision for co-owner bonds. The same result is
probably obtainable under Washington law by analogy to joint bank
accounts.
Powers of Appointment. An important difference exists between
the amount of half the value of the property." The creation of a joint tenancy pur-
suant to Washington law has the incidents of survivorship and severability required
under the foregoing hypothetical. See RCW 64.28.010. A discussion of federal joint
interest problems is found in Rudick, Federal Tax Problems Relating to Property
Owned in Joint Tenancy and Tenancy by the Entirety, 4 TAX L. REv. 3 (1948). The
1939 federal Code, like the present Washington Act, lacked any explicit provisions
for taxing jointly held property. Consequently, the courts resorted to property con-
cepts in order to subject the creation of joint tenancies to the gift tax. See Hopkins
v. Magueder, 122 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1941); Comm'r v. Logan, 109 F.2d 1014 (3d
Cir. 1940) ; Comm'r v. Hart, 106 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Lilly v. Smith, 96 F.2d 341
(7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 604 (1938). See also Stacy, Joint Tenancy and
Estate Planning, 37 WASH. L. REv. 44 (1962). Another example of a gift upon the
creation of a joint tenancy occurs when a joint tenancy is created and one of thejoint tenants contributes more than his proportionate share of the consideration for the
property. Then, there is also a gift of the surplus contribution. Rudick, supra.
25 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2515.
26 Washington Tax Commission Regulations Relating to Gift Taxes, Art. 7(d),
provides: "Where A creates a joint bank account for himself and B, there is a gift
to B when he draws upon the account for his own benefit to the extent of the amount
drawn." Compare Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (4) (1958). Joint bank accounts are
treated differently than joint tenancies as long as the depositor retains the power to
withdraw his deposit in full. The depositor (donor) by retaining control over the
deposit, has made an incomplete transfer. The transfer becomes complete upon a
withdrawal by the non-depositor.
27 Wolfe v. Hoefke, 124 Wash. 495, 214 Pac. 1047 (1923) ; Meyers v. Albert, 76
Wash. 218, 135 Pac. 1003 (1913). Cf. The Old Nat'l Bank & Union Trust Co. v.
Kendall, 14 Wn.2d 19, 126 P.2d 603 (1942).
28 See Daly v. Pac. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 154 Wash. 249, 282 Pac. 60 (1949).
29 Rev. Rul. 55-278, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 471. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (4) (1958).
[VOL. 38
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federal and Washington law concerning gifts of general powers of
appointment. Notwithstanding the possibility that there may be a
taxable transfer at the time of the creation of the power, 0 the federal
statute treats the exercise or release of such a power (created after
October 21, 1942) as a taxable transfer by the donee."' Washington
has no comparable provision, and only the creation of such a power
is treated as a taxable transfer under the Washington statute." Ac-
cordingly, under the federal statute two taxable transfers may result;
under the Washington statute there is only one.
ILLUSTmATION: In 1961, A transfers property in trust to T. B is
designated as the income beneficiary and also is given a general power
of appointment over the corpus. In 1962, B dies and exercises the
power by will in favor of C. Under the federal law: (1) A is subject
to the gift tax in 1961 by virtue of the transfer in trust (INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954 § 2511); (2) B is subject to the gift tax in 1962 by
virtue of the testamentary exercise of the power in favor of C. (INT.
RPv. CODE OF 1954, § 2514). Under the state law, A is subject to the
gift tax in 1961 because of the creation of the power in conjunction
with a disposition of property. It is treated as a gift from A to C.
(RCW 83.60.020).
To be taxable under RCW 83.60.020, the creation of a power of
appointment must be accompanied by a complete transfer of the prop-
erty subject to such power. 3 If the donor retains any control over
the property transferred (other than designating the ultimate bene-
ficiaries of the power), the transfer is incomplete and no taxable gift
results.3 '
30 If such a power is created in conjunction with a complete and irrevocable transfer
of property subject to the power, a taxable gift results. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §
2511. Accord, RCW 83.60.020. See also text accompanying note 37 infra. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 2514(c), defines a "general power of appointment" as a power which
is exercisable in favor of the individual possessing the power, his estate, his creditors,
or the creditors of his estate.
3 1 InT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2514(b). Note that this section deals only with general
powers of appointment. RCW 83.60.020 deals with powers of appointment. Accord-
ingly, special powers are within the purview of the Washington statute.
32 RCW 83.60.020 provides that when there is a "gift of a power of appointment,
in conjunction with a disposition of property which is effected before or after June 7,
1951, by inter vivos transfer direct or in trust or otherwise," such gift "is subject to
the gift tax laws of this state from the donor to the ultimate beneficiary thereof."
33RCW 83.60.010 defines "property" as any property subject to the power of
appointment.
34 A transfer of property over which the donor retains control is not the subject
matter of a completed gift. See text accompanying notes 10-22 supra. If property
subject to a power of appointment is still within the control of the donor, the power
of appointment itself is subject to the control of the donor and has not vested abso-
lutely in the donee.
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The Washington gift tax applies without regard to the exercise,"
non-exercise, termination, or renunciation of the power. The creation
is deemed a transfer subject to the gift tax laws as if it were a gift
from the donor to the ultimate beneficiary." The ultimate beneficiary
is "any person who becomes entitled to the property through the exer-
cise of the power, or by reason of nonexercise of the power, or by
reason of renouncement of the power by the donee, or by reason of
renouncement or waiver by the person appointed to receive the
property.M
7
The Washington tax is due as of the date of the creation of the
power. The duty of paying the tax is placed upon any person (in-
cluding a donee) who holds the property or the title thereto in trust
or otherwise. However, the duty to pay is not to be construed as
imposing a personal liability on such a person.39 The result, therefore,
seems to be that the donor is personally liable. But, on the other
hand, the tax may be paid out of the property transferred subject to
the power. In essence, this would subject the ultimate beneficiary to
the imposition of the tax by reducing the value of his gift to the
extent of the tax.
Implementation of the Washington gift tax upon the creation of a
power of appointment is impeded by the fact that the amount of the
tax imposed is determined by the relationship to the donor of the
ultimate beneficiary." The statute, recognizing that at the time of
creation the ultimate beneficiary is unknown, provides that the greatest
possible tax is to be paid at the date of the gift." Such tax is "a tenta-
tive tax computed on an assumed devolution of the property to an
ultimate beneficiary within the limitations of the power, who would
be taxable at the highest rates provided by the gift tax laws of this
state.
42
In order to relieve from the burden of this provision, alternative
methods for payment of the tax have been authorized in lieu of pay-
85 If a donee exercises the power by creating another power of appointment in
another donee to all or any of the property, such property is taxed as if the second
donee is the ultimate beneficiary thereof. RCW 83.60.080.86 RCW 83.60.020.
87 RCW 83.60.010.
38 RCW 83.60.030.
39 RCW 83.60.030.
40 See RCW 83.56.040.
41 RCW 83.60.050.
42 RCW 83.60.010. Example: S transfers Blackacre (worth $10,000) in trust,
giving his son a life estate and a power to appoint the remainder to himself or anyone
else, with a gift over in default to the son's estate. Although son may appoint himself
a beneficiary (Class A), he may appoint to anyone, including a Class C beneficiary.
Therefore, the higher Class C tax is due. See RCW 83.56.040.
[Voi- 38
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ment in full."3 (1) A surety bond in the amount-of the greatest possi-
ble tax may be executed in favor of the state of Washington. The
surety promises the tax commission that upon the exercise or termina-
tion of the power the commission will be notified and the final tax
paid in full. (2) The person subject to the duty" to pay the tax may
elect to pay a tentative tax based upon the probabilities of devolution
of the property. He must file a bond for the difference between the
tentative tax paid and the greatest possible tax.,5 Generally where
the cost (such cost is dependent upon the circumstances of each case)
of such bond is less than the donor's rate of return upon the money
which would pay the tentative gift tax and he is reasonably sure of the
ultimate beneficiary, it will be highly advisable to take advantage of
these alternatives, preferably number (1).
If the power is exercised or terminated prior to the procurement of
the bond or other security, the donee has the duty to so notify the
commission. The notice must include the ultimate beneficiary's name,
address and relationship to the donor. Failure to notify may subject
the donee to the gift tax liability."
Certain Annuities Under Qualified Plans. The Washington gift
tax statute has no provision comparable to section 2517 of the federal
code. This provision is an exception to section 2511, the general pro-
vision which taxes all transfers by gift. Under the general rule of
section 2511, if an employee with an unqualified right to an annuity
irrevocably elects to take a lesser annuity with a provision that, upon
his death, a survivor annuity will be paid to a designated beneficiary,
a gift of the survivor annuity will result." Section 2517, however,
provides that where an employee irrevocably names a beneficiary to
receive benefits from various employee trusts or from certain retire-
ment-annuity contracts" upon the employee's death, that portion of
the benefits attributable to the contributions made by the employer
is not subject to gift tax. A gift tax is payable on that portion repre-
'3 RCW 83.60.050.
44 Any person, including the donee, who holds the property or the title thereto in
trust or otherwise.
45The tax commission has the discretion to accept in lieu of any bond or payment
of the tax any other security which is deemed adequate. RCW 83.60.050. If any
tentative tax paid is determined to be in excess of the final tax, a refund of the excess
shall be granted by the commissioner, without interest. RCW 83.60.060.
4o RCW 83.60.040.
47 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (10) (1958). See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2517-1(a) (1)
(1961) listing three principal ways in which such a gift can be made.
4s See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2517(a) for a list of annuities qualifying for this
special gift tax treatment.
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sented by contributions of the employee. In the absence of an express
statutory provision to the contrary, the normal Washington rules con-
cerning transfers by gift are applicable. State gift tax consequences
will be the same as the result under section 2511 of the 1954 Code. 9
Certain Property Settlements. Under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939, property settlements between spouses were not regarded as
taxable gifts if the property settlement was incorporated in the decree
of divorce." The gift tax status of settlements not incorporated in
the decree of divorce depended upon the facts of each case.
Section 2516 of the 1954 Code has remedied the uncertainty in-
herent in the prior federal case law. Incorporation of the separation
agreement in the divorce decree need no longer be shown. Transfers
made pursuant to a separation agreement are deemed to be transfers
made for a full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth
if divorce occurs within two years thereafter.
The Washington statute has no specific provision concerning the
taxability of property settlements incident to divorce. As a practical
matter, usually no gift question will arise in these circumstances be-
cause most of such settlements merely split the community property
equally among the parties. However, if such a question were to arise
it is unclear whether similar treatment will be given transfers quali-
fying as non-taxable gifts pursuant to section 2516 of the 1954 Code,
or whether they will be handled as they were under the 1939 Code,
analyzed in the same light as any other transfer subject to the gift tax.
The preferable alternative is to accord such transfers the same treat-
ment as provided by federal law. This will remedy the confusion and
49 The general provisions of RCW 83.56.030 will be applied to determine if the
transfer is subject to taxation. See Washington Tax Commission Regulations Re-
lating to Gift Taxes, Art. 7(b), providing that "the transfer of property to B where
there is imposed upon B the obligation of paying a commensurate annuity to C would
constitute a gift to C."
50 Harris v. Comm'r, 340 U.S. 106 (1950). In this case H and W, preliminary to
divorce proceedings, entered into a property settlement agreement. The value of the
property transferred to H exceeded that received by W by over $100,000. The agree-
ment provided that it should be submitted to the divorce court "for its approval." It
also provided that "the covenants in this agreement shall survive any decree of divorce
which may be entered." The divorce decree provided that "said agreement and said
trust agreements forming a part thereof shall survive this decree." The Supreme
Court held that the transfers were founded upon the divorce decree and were not,
therefore, subject to the gift tax. Accord: McMurtry v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 659
(1st Cir. 1953).
Provisions for support and maintenance have been treated differently. An award
pursuant to a divorce decree incorporating a child support settlement has resulted
in a taxable gift in an amount equal to the excess beyond the child's needs. See
Rosenthal v. Comm'r, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Hooker v. Comm'r, 174 F.2d 863
(5th Cir. 1949).
[Voi- 38
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uncertainty inherent in this area and will avoid further conflict with
the federal law.
Annual Exclusion. Both Washington and federal law"1 provide an
annual exclusion permitting a donor to make a $3,000 gift per donee
without incurring gift tax liability. A $6,000 tax-free gift of community
property can be made because it is deemed to be a gift by each spouse
of one-half of the whole value of the property transferred." Generally,
a gift which qualifies for the annual exclusion under federal law will
also qualify for the state exclusion.
The exclusion is not applicable to gifts of "future interests." 8 A
leading federal case, Fondren v. Comm'r defines the term "future
interest" as follows:
[I] t is not enough to bring the exclusion into force that the donee has
vested rights. In addition he must have the right presently to use,
possess or enjoy the property. These terms are not words of art like
"fee" in the law of seizin, . . .but connote the right to substantial
present economic benefit. The question is of time, not when title vests,
but when enjoyment begins. Whatever puts the barrier of a sub-
stantial period between the will of the beneficiary or donee now to
enjoy what has been given him and that enjoyment makes the gift one
of a future interest within the meaning of the regulation. 55
The test of whether an interest is present or future, according to the
Fondren case, is whether the donee has a right to immediate possession
or enjoyment of the transferred property." Application of the "future
interest" rule is illustrated by this example: If S transfers property
to T in trust for B, with directions to accumulate the income from
the property for ten years and then to pay over the corpus and ac-
cumulated income to B, with a gift over to B's estate if B dies within
the ten year period, B receives a future interest." Note that the
donee of a gift in trust is the trust beneficiary rather than the trustee."
51 RCW 83.56.050; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
52 See RCW 83.56.030(2).53RCW 83.56.050; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
54 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
55 Id. at 20.
56 This rule is incorporated in Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (1958), providing that
"an unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of property or
the income from property (such as a life estate or term certain) is a present interest
in property. An exclusion is allowable with respect to a gift of such an interest (but
not in excess of the value of the interest)." Washington Tax Commission Regulations
Relating to Gift Taxes, Art. 4, employs a similar test defining a future interest as "any
estate or interest limited to commence in possession or enjoyment at a future date."
57 Other examples are presented in Treas. Reg. § 252503-3(c) (1958).
5s The leading case establishing this principle is Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S.
393 (1941). See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-2 (1958). This rule is consistent with the
19631
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Three problems in relation to the annual exclusion exist at both
state and federal levels. The first problem concerns whether a corpora-
tion can be treated as the donee of a gift. Neither act expressly pre-
cludes the possibility of a gift to a corporation.59 Unlike a trust, a
corporation is recognized as a separate legal entity. However, both
laws recognize that a gift made by a corporation is deemed to be made
by its shareholders."° Logically, the corporate entity should be dis-
regarded also in the case of a gift to a corporation, and the gifts treated
as gifts to the shareholders."' A gift to a corporation normally results
in the enhancement of the value of the shareholders' interest with
resultant benefit to the shareholders who are the actual owners of the
corporation. In this respect, a gift to a corporation is analogous to a
gift in trust. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Federal Tax Court
has held that a gift to a corporation is a gift to the corporate entity
itself rather than to its shareholders. 2 The inference arising from the
classification of a corporation as a Class C donee in the Washington
statute lends support to this proposition. 3 Although the law in this
area is ambiguous and inconsistent, it appears that a transfer to a
corporation under circumstances evidencing an intent to make the
corporate entity the donee will be treated as a gift to the corporation
at both state and federal levels.
The second problem concerns whether a transfer to a corporation is
a gift of a future interest. The Washington statute provides that a
gift to a corporation may be eligible for the annual exclusion.6" The
federal statute does not expressly classify gifts to corporations as
eligible for the exclusion.65 The term "any person" appearing in
section 2503(b), however, if construed in its broadest sense, would
theory that the gift tax is applicable only to a transfer of a beneficial interest in prop-
erty. The donor transfers only legal title to the trustee. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (g) (1)
(1958).
59 RCW 83.56.040 expressly includes corporations within Class C donees.
60 Washington Tax Commission Regulations Relating to Gift Taxes, Art. 7(a);
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h) (1) (1958).
61 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (h) (1) (1958), provides that "a transfer of property by
B to a corporation generally represents gifts by B to the other individual shareholders
of the corporation to the extent of their proportionate interests in the corporation."
(Emphasis added.)
62 Stephen F. Heringer, 21 T.C. 607 (1954), modified, 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956) ; Frank B. Thompson, 42 B.T.A. 121 (1940), modi-
fled 30 Am. Fed, Tax R. 1534 (6th Cir. 1942); Robert H. Scanlon, 42 B.T.A. 997
(1940).
30 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1534 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Robert H. Scanlon, 42 B.T.A. 997 (1940).
63 RCW 83.56.040.
64 RCW 83.56.050.
65 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503 (b).
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include corporations. 6 Where a gift is deemed made to the corporate
entity itself, the donor is entitled to one annual exclusion. If the gift
is treated as a gift to the shareholders the "future interest" problem
arises. In Heringer v. Comm'rl7 the Ninth Circuit court of appeals
held that a gift to a corporation, if treated as a gift to the shareholders,
would not be eligible for the annual exclusion. The court reasoned that
the shareholders could derive possession or enjoyment of the trans-
ferred property only upon the declaration of a dividend. Clearly, as
to the shareholders, this is "an interest limited to commence in posses-
sion or enjoyment at a future date." Note that if the gift is treated as
a gift of a present interest to the shareholders, the donor is allowed an
annual exclusion for each shareholder donee. However, in light of the
reasoning in the Heringer case, a donor who successfully establishes
that the individual shareholders are his donees rather than the corpor-
ate entity, will nevertheless not qualify for multiple annual exclusions.
Apparently Washington will follow the Heringer decision because the
"future interest" concept is viewed similarly. However, a persuasive
argument can be made in favor of a "present interest" under the
Heringer facts. The court assumes that a shareholder could only enjoy
the benefit of such transferred property upon the declaration of a
dividend. This assumption may not be warranted. Since the transfer
will increase the value of the stock, a shareholder could realize his
share of the benefit by selling his stock. No prior action need be taken
by the corporation to effect realization of such a benefit. Accordingly,
as long as a shareholder has the present right to sell his stock, he
necessarily has the present right to enjoy his share of the benefit from
the transferred property. The only flaw in the foregoing analysis is
that most gifts to corporation and shareholder problems arise in the
closely-held corporations where no readily available market exists for
such stock.
The third problem relating to the annual exclusion involves gifts to
minors. An outright unrestricted gift to a minor would be a gift of a
present interest. Ordinarily, however, the donor wishes to restrict the
gift in a way that will assure proper management and use. The donor
either transfers the property in trust or to a guardian, accompanied by
restrictions limiting the present use and enjoyment of the property
by the minor-donee.
66 Mertens, op. cit. supra note 22, at § 3825. See also, federal cases cited note 62
mipra.
87 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1956). This result is criticized in Lowndes and Kramer,
op. cit. supra note 10 at 582.
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Section 2503(c) of the 1954 Code provides that a gift to a minor
meeting certain requirements qualifies for the annual exclusion despite
its in futuro nature. Section 2503 (c) provides:
No part of a gift to an individual who has not attained the age of 21
years on the date of such transfer shall be considered a gift of a future
interest in property for purposes of subsection (b) if the property
and the income therefrom (1) may be expended by, or for the benefit
of, the donee before his attaining the age of 21 years, and (2) will to
the extent not so expended (A) pass to the donee on his attaining the
age of 21 years, and (B) in the event the donee dies before attaining
the age of 21 years, be payable to the estate of the donee as he may
appoint under a general power of appointment as defined in section
2514(c).
A gift to a minor meeting the foregoing requirements is deemed a
present interest and qualifies for the annual exclusion. Example: F
transfers property in trust to T with income payable to D, his minor
daughter. F gives T discretionary power to accumulate income or
invade corpus for the benefit of D. Corpus and accumulated income
pass to D at age 21 or to her estate if she dies before majority. F trans-
fers $3000 to the trust annually. These transfers qualify for the
federal annual exclusion. However, Washington has no comparable
provision. Therefore, since T has the power to accumulate income, D
does not have an unrestricted right to possession or enjoyment and the
annual exclusion is not available for Washington gift tax purposes.
In order to avoid such a result the Washington lawyer, in the ab-
sence of corrective legislation, must draft a trust instrument which will
qualify for the annual exclusion.68 Two federal cases, Kieckhejer v.
Comm'r6 and Stijel v. Comm'r,0 reaching different conclusions upon
substantially the same facts, have added to the uncertainty inherent in
this area. The question presented in each case was whether or not a
transfer in trust with the following termination provision constituted
a present interest:
The beneficiary shall be entitled to all or any part of the trust estate
or to terminate the trust estate in whole or in part at any time when-
ever said [minor donee] or the legally appointed guardian for his
estate shall make due demand therefor by instrument in writing, filed
with the then trustee and upon such demand being received by the
trustee the trustee shall pay said trust estate and its accumulations, or
68 See Wright, Gifts to Minor Children--Guardianship vs. Inter Vivos Trusts-Is
the Kieckhefer Trust the Answer? 27 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1952).
69 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
70 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952).
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the part thereof for which demands made, over to said [minor donee]
or to the legally appointed guardian for his estate who made such
demand on his behalf. (Emphasis added.)71
In Kieckhefer, the trust provision created a present interest. The
settlor had given the minor beneficiary the fullest rights of possession
and enjoyment consistent with the disabilities of infancy. The court
looked solely at the trust instrument to determine if the right to present
enjoyment or possession was conferred by the instrument. The fact
that a minor donee is subject to an extrinsic legal disability which
prevents him from terminating the trust effectively was not taken into
consideration.
However, in Stifel, the court held that the extrinsic factor of legal
disability must be taken into consideration. Since the legal guardian
had not yet been appointed, no one could terminate the trust, and the
minor donee's right to possess or enjoy the trust property was post-
poned. Therefore, the court found a future interest.
A recent Washington attorney general's opinion concludes that the
Kiecktefer decision "is the preferable result and within the intended
area of exclusion established by the legislature."7 Presumably, a
transfer to a Kieckhefer-type trust will be deemed a present interest
qualifying for the annual exclusion granted by RCW 84.56.050." Note
that the Kieckhefer-type trust qualified as a present interest within
the requirements of section 2503(c) of the 1954 Code. Accordingly,
a transfer in trust which meets the requirements of section 2503 (c)
probably will be treated as a present interest for the purposes of
RCW 83.56.050.
The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act provides the donor with another
method of transferring present interests to a minor.74 This Act allows
an adult to make a gift of a security or money to a minor as long as
71 Kieckhefer v. Comm'r, 189 F2d 118, 120 (7th Cir. 1951).
72 AGO 59-60 NO. 81 p. 5. The Attorney General takes the following position:
"The determination of what interests are the subject of gift, for gift tax exclusion
purposes, should be limited to the determination of whether enforceable rights have
been conferred upon the donee by the trust instrument. If the inquiry ends here, gifts
to minors and adults alike are subject to the same limitations upon the annual ex-
clusion. Direct, unconditional transfers to either are gifts of present interests....
[T]he disabilities incident to minority imposed by law for the protection of a child
from his own improvidence or the improvidence of his elders, should not render the
gift to a minor a future interest. We should not indulge in legal fiction to change a
present interest into a future interest merely because of the donee's minority."
73 AGO 59-60 No. 81 is on file in the office of the Washington Tax Commissioner
and apparently has been adopted as their position.
74 Codified in RCW chapter 2124. The Washington Tax Commission takes the
position that a transfer which meets the requirements of the Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act is a transfer of a present interest qualifying for the annual exclusion. The Internal
Revenue Service adopts the same position. Rev. Rul. 56-86 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 449.
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such security or money is held by a custodian for the benefit of the
minor." However, the utility of the Act is restricted by several limita-
tions. Only gifts of securities or money may be made. The amount
of the gift is limited to $3,000 per minor donee per year."' Suppose F
transfers separate property consisting of securities worth $5,000 to
X, an adult, as custodian for S, F's minor son. Is $3,000 worth of the
securities treated as custodial property subject to the provisions of the
Act? A close reading of RCW 21.24.020(4) (a) requires a negative
answer.7  Also, a donor may not make gifts of custodial property
exceeding thirty thousand dollars in aggregate to any one minor."8
The advantage of qualifying a gift under the Uniform Gifts to
Minors Act is that such a gift is deemed irrevocable and conveys to
the minor indefeasibly vested legal title to the security or money trans-
ferred."9 The transfer qualifies for the annual exclusion because the
donee has received an "unrestricted" present right to possession or
enjoyment of the gift. The donor, at the same time, is assured that the
transferred property will be properly administered, the Act vesting
the custodian with certain rights and duties."0 In essence, the custodian
has the same discretionary powers as the trustee of a trust which
qualifies under section 2503(c) of the 1954 Code.
Specific Exemption. A lifetime exemption of $30,000 is available
to the donor under the federal gift tax law. Washington allows a
maximum lifetime exemption of no more than $11,000.
The federal exemption applies to any transfer by gift to any donee.81
Application of the Washington exemption is limited by the donor-donee
relationship. The statute divides the donees into classes according to
75 The manner of making a gift to a minor pursuant to the Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act is set out in RCW 21.24.020 as follows: "(1) An adult person may, during his
lifetime, make a gift of a security or money to a person who is a minor on the date
of the gift: (a) If the subject of the gift is a security in registered form, by regis-
tering it in the name of the donor, another adult person, or a trust company, followed,
in substance, by the words: 'As custodian for (name of minor) under the Washington
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act'; (b) if the subject of the gift is a security not in
registered form, by delivering it to a trust company or an adult person other than
the donor, accompanied by a statement of gift . . . . Security is defined in RCW
21.24.010(2).
76 RCW 21.24.020 (4) (a). Six thousand dollars worth of community securities may
be transferred. See RCW 83.56.030 (2). The original uniform act has no such dollar
limitation. See § 2 Uniform Gifts to Minors Act 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 183
(1957).
77 RCW 21.24.020(4) provides: "The donor may not under this chapter make gifts
of custodial property (a) exceeding three thousand dollars in aggregate value to any
one minor in any one year . ...
78 RCW 21.24.020(4) (b).
79 RCW 21.24.030(1).
80 See RCW 21.24.040.
81 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2521.
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their relationship-an exemption of $10,000 is allowed for gifts to
Class A;" $1,000 for Class B gifts;8" and no exemption is allowed for
Class C gifts.8
The federal gift tax is computed upon the amount of taxable gifts
less deductions, which include the $30,000 exemption.85 Therefore, the
specific exemption may be used to reduce the amount of taxable gifts,
placing the donor in lower federal gift tax brackets. The Washington
lifetime exemption will not place the taxpayer in a lower tax bracket.
This is because the exemption is merely offset against the lowest-
bracket gifts,88 and does not reduce the aggregate amount of gifts,
which is the basis for imposition of the gift tax8"
ILLUSTRATION: (Assuming that A has never before used any of his
lifetime exemption): A, a bachelor, transfers $38,000 worth of stock
by gift to B, his sister. A is subject to federal gift tax liability on a
taxable gift of $5,000 ($38,000 less $30,000 lifetime exemption and
$3,000 annual exclusion). This puts him in the lowest federal gift tax
bracket (24 %). However, A is subject to Washington gift tax liability
on a net gift of $35,000 ($38,000 less $3,000 annual exclusion). The
lifetime exemption of $1,000 for Class B gifts is set off against $1,000
of the net gift in the lowest tax bracket. Consequently, A is subject
to tax upon $4,000 of net gifts in the 2.7 (90% of 3%) tax bracket,
$5,000 of net gifts in the 3.6% (90% of 4%) tax bracket, $20,000 of
net gifts in the 6.3% (90% of 7%) tax bracket, and $5,000 of net
gifts in the 9% (90% of 107) tax bracket.
Computation of Tax. Another significant difference between state
and federal gift taxation concerns the effective dates of the laws. Both
laws are computed on the aggregate amount of taxable gifts. However,
the federal tax aggregates such gifts from June 6, 19328 and the
Washington tax aggregates such gifts from March 21, 1941.8 There-
fore, a current gift may be added to a higher aggregate of gifts for
federal tax purposes than for state purposes. Also, the specific federal
82 Class A donees include: lineal ancestors, lineal descendants, husband, wife, step-
child or lineal descendant of a stepchild, adopted child or lineal descendant of an
adopted child, adopted child of the lineal descendant of the donor, son-in-law, or
daughter-in-law. RCW 83.56.040.
83 Class B donees include brothers or sisters. RCW 83.56.040.
84 Class C donees include any other person not mentioned in Class A or B. RCW
83.56.040.8 5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503 (a).
88 See RCW 83.56.040.
87 See RCW 83.56.040,.050.8 8 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2502.
so RCW 83.56.040 and RCW 8.56.005.
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lifetime exemption may have been expended over the longer accumu-
lation period, while the state exemption may still be available.
Charitable or Similar Gifts. Several differences exist between the
Washington and federal acts which may cause problems in determining
the amount of the "charitable" deduction allowed by RCW 83.56.060
and section 2522 of the 1954 Code.
(a) The state law allows a nonresident the same deductions as a
resident.9" The federal law has a specific provision for non-
resident deductions.91
(b) The federal law allows a deduction for gifts made to the United
States, any State, Territory, or any political subdivision thereof,
for exclusively public purposes.92 Under the Washington statute,
only gifts to the United States or the state of Washington are
deductible. An exclusive public purpose is not expressly re-
quired to qualify the gift in Washington."
(c) A gift to a corporation, trust, etc., otherwise qualifying for the
deduction, is not deductible under federal law if a substantial
part of its activities concern carrying on propaganda or other-
wise attempting to influence legislation.9" No such limitation
exists under the Washington Act.
(d) The Washington Act has no provision comparable to the federal
provision which allows a deduction for a gift to "posts or or-
ganizations of war veterans, or auxiliary units or societies of
any such posts or organizations.""
90 RCW 83.56.060.
91 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2522(b). A nonresident is allowed substantially
the same deductions as a citizen or resident subject to two exceptions: (1) If the
gifts are made to or for the use of a corporation, the corporation must be one created
or organized under the laws of the United States or of any State or Territory thereof.
(2) If the gifts are made to or for the use of a trust, community chest, fund or
foundation, or a fraternal society, order or association operating under the lodge
system, the gifts must be for use within the United States. See Treas. Reg. §
25.2522(b) (1) (1958). The Washington statute allows a nonresident to make a gift
to a corporation whether or not it is organized under the laws of Washington. Does
this mean that the corporation may be organized under the laws of Canada? If so, a
nonresident is allowed a deduction under state law.
92 INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 2522(a) (1). RCW 83.56.060, providing that the de-
duction is applicable to a gift to a municipal or public corporation, school district or
any school or educational institution in this state supported by public funds in whole
or in part, is substantially comparable.
93RCW 83.56.060(1) and (2). It may be argued that for a gift to qualify as a
gift to the United States or the state of Washington (as governmental units) it must
be for an exclusive public purpose.
94 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2522 (a) (2).
95 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2522(a) (4). It may be argued that a gift to such an
organization is included within the provisions of RCW 83.56.060(5), allowing a de-
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(e) Encouragement of art and the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals is included within the purposes of qualified organiza-
tions under the federal provision." Washington lacks a similar
provision.
Gifts to Spouse (Marital Deduction). The Federal Code allows
the donor a deduction equal to one-half the value of any property
interest transferred by gift to his spouse." This deduction is allowed
in order to provide equality of tax treatment for residents of non-
community property states. It extends to such persons the "splitting"
process formerly enjoyed only by residents of community property
states, and does not apply where the donor's interest in community
property is transferred to his spouse."
Washington has no similar provision. A gift of the donor's separate
property to his spouse, to be held as her separate property, will be
taxable to the full amount of the gift.9
CONCLUSION
This comment has demonstrated several areas in which different tax
consequences result at the state and federal levels. The differences are
not justifiable and have resulted primarily from failure to revise and
modernize the Washington gift tax statute. The ideal gift tax statute
would be one producing the same gift tax consequences at both state
and federal levels. Administration of the gift tax would then be greatly
facilitated. Federal rulings, regulations and cases would be more per-
suasive, increasing the certainty of the state law. In the absence of
such revision, the Washington lawyer must keep the various dis-
tinctions in mind. It is easy to overlook the Washington gift tax aspects
of a given transfer when the federal tax is uppermost in mind.
Riic4 H. Wn.Lims
duction for a gift to an organization exclusively engaged in charitable, public or other
like work. As a practical matter, a substantial number of these organizations are
primarily social in nature.
96 INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 2522(a) (2) and (3).
9 7 INv. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2523 (a).98 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2523 (f). The marital deduction applies only to trans-
fers of separate property.
99 See RCW 83.56.030. Compare, Washington Tax Commission Regulations Re-
lating to Gift Taxes, Art. 7(g), providing: "When separate property of one spouse
is in any way converted into community property of both spouses, there is a gift of
one-half the value of the property from the spouse owning the separate property, to
the other spouse." In this situation the donor has given up control of only one-half
of the property. When the property is held separately by the donee, the donor has
transferred complete control, hence, a gift occurs of all the property under RCW
83.56.030.
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